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Abstract 
The correct application of customary law post constitutionalism 
continues to be the subject of much judicial and academic  
deliberation. This is especially true where the existence and/or 
scope of customary rights and cultural practices are not well 
defined in a specific case. Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture,  
Forestry and Fisheries 2018 5 SA 104 (SCA) presents a perfec t  
example of the dissonance between the recognition of 
customary law by the Constitution of the Republic of South 
Africa, 1996 and the regulation of rights and cultural practices 
emanating from customary law. The case grapples with the 
meeting point of customary rights and customs and the need to 
preserve the environment. This intersection is considered in 
view of earth jurisprudence as an emerging legal thought topic 
in environmental law. On the whole, the decision of the SCA 
demonstrates encouraging signs of an appreciation of 
customary law as deserving of an equal place on the 
legal podium.
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1 Introduction 
Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries1 (hereinafter 
Gongqose) pits two interests on different scales of the law against each 
other. On the one hand, there are customary rights or cultural practices, 
which stem from customary law, while on the other hand there is a question 
of the preservation or sustainability of the ecosystem, which for the 
purposes of this case note falls to be considered under marine law. It is 
common cause that customary law has not always enjoyed the legal status 
and recognition that it is afforded under the Constitution.2 Notwithstanding 
this, however, a constitutional framework and jurisprudence as new as that 
in South Africa will continuously seek clarification of rights and the 
establishment or understanding of cultural practices and autonomy. 
Sections 303 and 314 of the South Africa Constitution of 1996, read together, 
provide for the entrenchment of the rights to culture and cultural practices. 
Significantly, section 30 extends to everyone the right to "… participate in 
the cultural life of their choice" consistent with the provisions of the Bill of 
Rights, which must necessarily also include the right to a safe environment, 
as enshrined in section 245 of the Constitution.  
The recognition and enjoyment of cultural life is negated to a considerable 
degree by the oral tradition of customary law. Thus, customary tales told 
and teachings conveyed through narration by elders, through songs or even 
through cultural games may be lost on future generations, or even worse, 
                                                 
* Phillip Lesetja Monyamane. LLB LLM (UNISA). Lecturer in Dept of Private Law, 
University of Limpopo, South Africa. E-mail: Lesetja.monyamane@ul.ac.za.  
**  Mpho Paulos Bapela. LLB LLM (UL). Lecturer in Dept of Jurisprudence, Legal 
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1  Gongqose v Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries  2018 5 SA 104 (SCA) 
(hereafter Gongqose). 
2  Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (the Constitution). 
3  Everyone has the right to use the language and to participate in the cultural life of 
their choice, but no one exercising these rights may do so in a manner inconsistent 
with any provision of the Bill of Rights. 
4  "(1) Persons belonging to a cultural, religious or linguistic community may not be 
denied the right, with other members of that community— (a) to enjoy their culture, 
practise their religion and use their language; and (b) to form, join and maintain 
cultural, religious and linguistic associations and other organs of civil society. (2) The 
rights in subsection (1) may not be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any 
provision of the Bill of Rights." 
5  "Everyone has the right– (a) to an environment that is not harmful to their health or 
well-being; and (b) to have the environment protected, for the benefit of present and 
future generations, through reasonable legislative and measures that - (i) prevent  
pollution and ecological degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure 
ecologically sustainable development and use of natural resources while promoting 
justifiable economic and social development." 
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lost through translation by third parties. These tales are known to invoke 
some sort of emotion in their audience; from the jesting tales told around 
the fire in the dead of night to the horror tales about evil spirits marauding 
the streets in search of evil people. One of the documented examples of 
customary folklore that has a bearing on cultural practices is documented 
by Ratiba6 in his reference to the tales on the famous Lake Fanduzi in 
Venda. He notes that:7 
By way of an example… [O]ne story (emanating from the villagers) holds that, 
at times, a white sheep mysteriously appears on the water and just as 
suddenly vanishes. Added to this is the tale that outsiders who have tried to 
do water sports on the lake have apparently all drowned – a tale that is 
coupled with many accounts of sightings of a white crocodile guarding the 
ancestral spirits who inhabit the lake.  
The customary law rights or cultural practices are now acknowledged by the 
Constitution.8 Notwithstanding this recognition by the text of the 
Constitution, their position on the legal podium is not always clear. In 2003 
the Constitutional Court in Alexkor Ltd v Ricktersveld Community,9 while at 
pains to express its views relating to the perverse treatment of customary 
law, used a rather generous description of the role of customary law in our 
jurisprudence post constitutionalism. The Court noted that "indigenous law 
feeds into, nourishes, fuses with and becomes part of the amalgam of South 
African law."10 Notwithstanding this rather generous reference to the 
standing of customary law, the Supreme Court of Appeal in Gongqose 
opens its decision with a blunt take on the supposed fusion of customary 
law into our jurisprudence; vis "[t]his appeal brings customary law, which 
has not occupied its rightful place in this country, directly to the fore."11 This 
take seems to echo the views of some academics whose contention is that 
customary law, norms and practices operate on the periphery of mainstream 
law. To sum up, Ratiba aptly states that "African cultural practices and any 
other cultural ethos for that matter have, since the time when Africa came 
to meet with the West, always been and still are the subject of ridicule, 
belittlement and largely eschewed by western civilization."12 
It is against this backdrop that the section 30 rights may be easier to enjoy 
in theory than in practice. This is especially true, as Gongqose proves, 
                                                 
6  Ratiba 2013 Indilinga 143. 
7  Ratiba 2013 Indilinga 143. 
8  Gongqose para 22. 
9  Alexkor Ltd v Richtersveld Community 2004 5 SA 460 (CC) (hereafter Alexkor) paras 
51-53. 
10  Alexkor para 51. 
11  Gongqose para 1. 
12  Ratiba 2015 Indilinga 210. 
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where the customary law rights or cultural practices falls into a Marine 
Protected Area (MPA). This is so because marine law has largely been an 
area of law that has not been well aired in our jurisprudence. Bapela 
ascribes the lack of research as emanating from the belief that substances 
entering the sea become diluted by the huge body of water until their 
concentration becomes unimportant.13 
This said, this case note endeavors to investigate the application and 
provenance of customary law rights or cultural practices in marine protected 
areas. The investigation will consider earth jurisprudence theory as the 
emerging school of thought on law and governance on the well-being of the 
earth and all its inhabitants.14 This is largely motivated by the escalation of 
the crisis in environmental issues, as instanced by marine pollution.  
2 Culture and the environment 
In his seminal article on the intersection between these two interest areas 
or fields, Feris15 grappled with the conundrum of the deep-seated ties 
between traditional communities and the oceans and their resources, and 
the need to adopt and implement stringent measures aimed at protecting 
these threatened resources. This area of legal contestation, we contend, is 
scarcely ever studied locally. We draw from the facts and decision in 
Gongqose to demonstrate this view.  
2.1 The facts and the legal history 
On 22 September 2010 the appellants (MD Gongqose, S Windase and N 
Juza) were arrested and charged with attempting to fish in a marine 
protected area without permission, in contravention of section 43(2)(a) of 
the Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (MLRA) (count 1); entering a 
national wildlife reserve area without a permit in contravention of section 
29(1)(a) of the Transkei Environmental Conservation Decree No 9 of 1992 
(count 2); entering a national wildlife reserve while being in possession of a 
weapon or trap, to wit, fishing rods, lines and hooks, in contravention of 
section 29(1)(b) of the Conservation Decree (count 3); and wilfully killing or 
injuring or disturbing any wildlife animal other than fish caught in accordance 
                                                 
13  Bapela Legal Analysis of the Prohibition of Marine Pollution 1. Admittedly, Bapela's  
research was completed in 2016 and should not be passed off as current. However,  
despite their best efforts, the authors were unable to find that there has been a more 
recent change in attitude.  
14  Koons 2009 Penn St Envtl L Rev 47. 
15  Feris 2013 PELJ 557-562. 
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with such regulations as may be prescribed in terms of the Conservation 
Decree, in contravention of section 29(1)(c) (count 4). 
The appellants pleaded not guilty to the charges in the Magistrate's Court, 
Elliotdale.16 The premise of their defence was that their conduct was not 
unlawful because they were exercising their customary right to fish. The 
Magistrate's Court, despite a positive finding on the customary right use, 
convicted them of contravening section 43(2)(a) of the MLRA but acquitted 
them of all the other charges. The appellants were granted leave to appeal 
against their convictions.  
One of the grounds of appeal, significant for the purposes of this note, was 
that the declaration of the MPA by the Minister on 29 December 2000 was 
reviewable and fell to be set aside, inter alia on the ground that in declaring 
the MPA the Minister failed to recognise the appellants' customary rights. 
Before the Appeal was heard in the High Court, section 43 of the MLRA was 
repealed by the Marine Living Resources Amendments Act 5 of 2014 
(MLRAA). Despite this development the High Court upheld the 
convictions.17 The High Court granted the appellants leave to appeal to the 
Supreme Court of Appeal. On the whole, the appeal raised four issues, 
namely the status of customary law; whether the appellants had proved that 
they were exercising customary rights to access to and the use of marine 
resources when the offence was committed; whether the MLRA 
extinguished those rights; and whether the appellants' conduct was 
unlawful. 
2.2 The decision 
A careful judge would have been advised to scrutinize the provenance of each 
rule. In addition, she would have been advised to begin each case by 
considering a possible conflict of laws; did common or customary law apply to 
the facts, and, if the latter, which specific system?18 
Almost a decade on from the opinion of Bennett on the provenance of 
customary law rights in litigation, the Supreme Court of Appeal heeded the 
call to properly scrutinise the provenance of customary law rules in as far 
as the application of customary rights or cultural practices is concerned. 
Section 39 of the Constitution has long been recognised as enjoining the 
                                                 
16  S v Gongqose (Elliotdale Magistrate’s Court) (unreported) case number E328/10.  
17  S v Gongqose 2016 1 SACR 556 (ECM). 
18  Bennett 2009 Am J Comp L 11. 
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court to take stock of customary law whilst promoting the three pillars of our 
Constitution; vis the spirit, purport and object of the Bill of Rights.19 
To properly locate the above reference and the inference drawn from it, this 
note shall now discuss the decision in Gongqose under the following 
heading; the curious case of customary law and rights under the 
Constitution and the significance of terrestrial resources to indigenous 
communities.  
2.2.1 The curious case of customary law and rights under the Constitution 
While in the past [customary] law was seen through the common law lens, it 
must now be seen as an integral part of our law. Like all law it depends for its 
ultimate force and validity on the Constitution. Its validity must now be 
determined by reference not to common law, but to the Constitution. The 
courts are obliged by section 211 of the Constitution to apply customary law 
when it is applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that deals 
with customary law.20 
It is well documented that the history of customary law and its legitimacy as 
a viable and unique system of law is a troubled one. It had been hoped that 
the birth of constitutionalism would coincide with a new dawn for the 
application of customary law.21 The question of whether this has taken 
place, has been partly achieved or is not taking place at all does not lend 
itself to an easy answer. However, the Gongqose and Alexkor judgments 
provide in the clearest of terms that customary law is in actual fact 
considered equal with the common law post constitutionalism and that the 
rights or cultural practices that underlie it now enjoy full protection. Be that 
as it may, it must be noted that customary law not only undergoes 
constitutional scrutiny but is also faced with underlying problems of 
theoretical location in the new dispensation. To this effect, Ndima22 identifies 
a number of theoretical nuances and the proponents of each position: the 
view that the Constitution perpetuates the inferior status of African law, the 
view that African values are inconsistent with the South African Constitution, 
the view that there is a synergy between the African value system and the 
                                                 
19  "When interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum (a) must promote the 
values that underlie an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom; (b) must consider international law; and (c) may consider 
foreign law. (2) When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport  
and objects of the Bill of Rights. (3) The Bill of Rights does not deny the existence of 
any other rights or freedoms that are recognised or conferred by common law, 
customary law or legislation, to the extent that they are consistent with the Bill." 
20  Alexkor para 51. 
21  Ndima 2017 Obiter 15. 
22  Ndima 2017 Obiter 18-32. 
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South African Constitution, the view that the communal nature of African 
culture makes it amenable to the values of the Constitution and the view 
that certain rules, principles and concepts of traditional African law are 
central to the resolution of socio-legal disputes. The identification of so 
many positions in the conceptualisation of customary law under the prism 
of the Constitution only serves to affirm the absence of a comprehensive 
African legal theory.23 With so many divergent views on the standing of 
customary law, it is no surprise that in Alexkor the court sounded a caveat 
against the use of textbooks and old authorities because of their propensity 
to view it through foreign lenses.24 Before Gongqose25 it could not have 
been far-fetched or too naïve to be pessimistic, as was Sibanda when he 
expressed this opinion:26 
During the fifteen years since commencement of the democratic dispensation,  
much has been done in the name of reforming and integrating customary law 
in order to make it comport with the South Africa's constitutional project. 
Without a precise prescription as to what form a constitutionally complaint 
customary law regime would take, scholars have portrayed the process of 
incorporation and reform as a delicate balancing act, seeking to promote 
customary law's cultural uniqueness as an indigenous African enterprise … .  
That the Constitution recognises the independence and originality of 
customary law as a source of law is undisputable. This is amply 
demonstrated by the inclusion of section 211 into the text of the 
Constitution.27 To give provenance to the text of section 211, the court in 
Gongqose noted 3 points of cardinal importance.28 
First, customary law 'is protected by and subject to the Constitution in its own 
right.' … Second, the legislative authority of Parliament to pass laws dealing 
with customary law has not been ousted. And third, the injunction to apply 
                                                 
23  Himonga and Bosch 2000 SALJ 318. 
24  Alexkor para 54. 
25  While there has been a number of leading cases on customary law post 
constitutionalism, it is also well worth noting that most of these judgments have not 
escaped criticism on the application of the proper provenance of customary law and 
customary rights or cultural rights. By way of an example, the reader is referred to 
Ntlama 2009 Stell LR 2009, which chastises the Shilubana v Nwamitwa 2009 2 SA 
66 (CC) judgment.  
26  Sibanda 2010 Human Rights Brief 1. 
27  "(1) The institution, status and role of traditional leadership, according to customary 
law, are recognised, subject to the Constitution. (2) A traditional authority that 
observes a system of customary law may function subject to any applicable 
legislation and customs, which includes amendments to, or repeal of, that legislation 
or those customs. (3) The courts must apply customary law when that law is 
applicable, subject to the Constitution and any legislation that specifically deals with 
customary law." 
28  Gongqose para 23.  
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customary law is not rendered subject to any legislation generally, but only to 
'legislation that specifically deals with customary law'.  
In essence, therefore, it can no longer be either necessary or desirable to 
question the legitimacy of customary law as a source of law. Not only this 
but also, we contend, the clear elucidation of this point by the Supreme 
Court of Appeal means that the temptation to view customary law through 
the lens of the common law should be a thing of the past. Moving from this 
clear recognition of customary law as a system of law in its own right, it 
becomes much easier to grapple with the question of the applicability of 
customary rights or cultural practices in the light of the Constitution, as the 
court did in Gongqose.  
The oral nature of customary law being common cause, however, the 
appellants in Gongqose were faced with the challenge of leading evidence 
to prove the existence of their right not only to go fishing but also to gain 
access to the MPA to perform their ancestral rituals in terms of custom. 
From paragraph 27 to 32 the court systematically notes the evidence 
presented to prove the existence of their right to go fishing in terms of 
custom, and in paragraphs 28 and 29 in particular addresses the cultural 
practice related to the use of waters for medicinal reasons. Having 
considered all factors, the court found that the appellants indeed proved the 
existence of a tradition of "utilising marine and terrestrial resources".29  
2.2.2 The significance of terrestrial resources to the Dwesa-Cwebe 
communities  
The recognition of the right of a subsistence fisher who catches fish for 
personal or family consumption is not the recognition of a customary law right 
to fish. While the activities of some customary fishers may include subsistence 
fishing, subsistence fishers are not necessarily persons who fish in terms of 
customary law. Further, the appellants established in evidence that their 
customary rights to access to and the use of marine resources were not 
confined to consumption, but were exercised for purposes of customary 
rituals, ancestral ceremonies and adornment.30  
The above passage from the judgment cannot be emphasised enough in 
demonstrating the significance of the terrestrial resources to the Dwesa-
Cwebe communities, of which Mr Gongqose and his co-accused were 
members. This finding follows on the evidence of Mr Gongqose and Dr Fay 
pertaining to the hardships experienced by the community pursuant to the 
declaration of a MPA. Two main things are of interest here: firstly, the 
averment in paragraph 28 that the ban had adversely affected traditional 
                                                 
29  Gongqose para 39. 
30  Gongqose para 53. 
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health practitioners in their work, and secondly that the community's right to 
fish had been infringed upon. 
Sight should not be lost of the fact that there is, in positive law, a clear 
distinction between custom and law.31 However, taken in a correct context, 
as we submit the court did, customary law is "inextricably bound to linguistic 
expression and the traditional world view of the Africans whose narratives, 
stock-stories and folklore it embodies."32 Therefore, the evidence of Mr 
Gongqose on the customs and rules of the use of the terrestrial resources 
speaks more to what one may refer to as the law that regulated the 
surrounding communities. This is so, as Ndima noted, because "[i]ts 
[customary law] meaning is heavily dependent on context. This meaning 
cannot be found by randomly asking what a particular rule, principle, 
institution, concept or doctrine means, without regard to the social world in 
which it appears."33 In essence, therefore, customary law, when considered 
in the context and the social reality where it is applicable, may very flexibly 
arrive at decisions in congruence with constitutionalism.  
At present there is no legislation that directly impacts on the regulation of 
terrestrial resources with specific interests on communal customs and the 
traditional way of life. One such communal use of environmental resources 
is the use of the sea for the purposes of ancestral rituals. In Gongqose 
shades of the sacred use of the sea for traditional healing features only as 
far as it relates to the support of the inference of the existence of relevant 
customary rights or cultural practices by the surrounding communities. 
However, mention must be made of the deeply spiritual processes of 
traditional healing. Ancestors and ancestral spirits are a part of the common 
language of the majority of African people. In fact, there is an 
acknowledgement of the widespread belief that "when a man dies, his spirit 
is incorporated into the collectivity of ancestors, which corresponds to a 
unilineal descent group among the living."34 In his phenomenological study 
of the process of becoming a traditional healer, Sodi35 identifies three 
important functions, namely the integration of personality, the acquisition of 
clinical competence, and the attainment of transcendental experiences. Of 
importance, however, is his observation that the trainees' period of transition 
is preceded by illness for a duration of time. While the specifics of the 
training are by their very nature clandestine, we submit that the need for 
                                                 
31  Bennett 2009 Am J Comp L 2. 
32  Ndima 2003 CILSA 328. 
33  Ndima 2003 CILSA 328. 
34  Ratiba 2015 Indilinga 214. 
35  Sodi Phenomenological Study of Healing 177-180. 
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access to environmental resources with ancestral connections should not 
be frustrated by indirect environmental arguments or a regulatory 
framework. As noted in Gongqose in evidence, traditional healers struggled 
with the regulation of the MPA. It is already indicated above that the period 
preceding the acquisition of traditional competence to become a healer is a 
troubled one in some cases and may prove fatal as a result of restricted 
access to marine resources. This is also especially important if one 
considers that a customary knowledge system as transmitted from 
generation to generation does not necessarily conflict with emerging 
thought on environmental issues; namely earth jurisprudence.  
3 Earth jurisprudence 
Earth jurisprudence has brought about a shift in theoretical focus from an 
anthropocentric view to an eco-centric one.36 In the advancement of the 
latter view, Kortenkamp and Moore echo the notion that nature should be 
protected not because it is of value to human beings, but because it has an 
intrinsic value.37 We submit that Kortenkamp and Moore's views negate the 
idea that some components of the earth are not useful, and as such need 
no protection. Thus, the earth is a subject that needs protection from human 
exploitation, and is not a collection of phenomena that exists for human 
use.38 In the quest of preserving the earth by advancing the principles of 
earth jurisprudence, caution must be exercised in circumstances that 
involve customs and rituals. In his preparation for the Earth Laws 
Symposium Animal Rights and the Rights of Nature at Southern Cross 
University, Wright stated that:39 
… in Earth Jurisprudence, the legitimacy of killing an animal depends on the 
circumstances, and Earth Jurisprudence itself varies based on the ecological 
characteristics of locality, local custom and the relationship between nature 
and the person killing the animal. Writers contrast an indigenous hunter killing 
a zebra for food in accordance with traditional rituals and customs, with a 
hunter that is out to make some extra cash. 
The above utterance buttresses the Dwesa-Cwebe communities' practice 
of exercising their customary law right to fishing. The customary law right 
has always been in existence and practised by the Dwesa-Cwebe 
communities. The testimony of Dr Fay alludes to historical evidence of 
                                                 
36  Koons 2009 Penn St Envtl L Rev 47. 
37 Kortenkamp and Moore 2001 J Environ Psychol 1. 
38  Burdon 2012 AJLP 31. 
39  Wright 2012 https://boulderrightsofnature.org/wp-content/uploads/2AR-RON.pdf 1. 
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fishing and the collection of shellfish since at least the 18th century by the 
members of the communities.40  
In circumstances where customs and rituals are not at stake, earth 
jurisprudence is endeavouring to forward the protection of nature. A prime 
example of the advancement of this notion is article 71 of the Constitution 
of Ecuador, which codifies the rights of nature.41 Read on its own, the 
codification of the rights of nature is by all accounts a good act of 
draftsmanship in the advancement of an earth-centred approach to 
environmental preservation. While in section 39(1)(c) the South African 
Constitution allows for the consultation of foreign law in coming to a decision 
in matters before courts, the South African regulatory framework grapples 
differently with the issue of environmental protection. For the purposes of 
this case note, the consideration of the regulatory framework will be limited 
to that part of it dealing with marine protection.  
4 Regulatory framework of marine law 
4.1 Introduction  
The growing concern for the protection of the marine environment has led 
to a need for some form of statutory protection and regulation. This is 
evident in the Gonqose case, where the Dwesa-Cwebe communities were 
dispossessed of their land. Historically they had relied on forest and marine 
resources for their livelihood. The deprivation was done in terms of 
regulatory frameworks such as the Transkei Nature Conservation Act 6 of 
197142, the Sea Fisheries Act 58 of 197343 and the Marine Living Resources 
Act 18 of 1998 (MLRA).44 The common goal of the aforementioned 
regulatory framework was to protect the marine environment. The repeal of 
the abovementioned regulatory framework, with the exclusion of the MLRA, 
directs our focus to the Constitution, the National Environmental 
Management: Protected Areas Act 57 of 2003 (NEMPA) and Marine Living 
Resources Act as the current regulatory framework for our topic.  
                                                 
40  Gongqose para 39. 
41  Nature, or Pacha Mama, where life is reproduced and occurs, has the right to respect 
for its existence and for the maintenance and regeneration of its life cycles, structure, 
functions and evolutionary processes. The state shall give incentives to natural 
persons and legal entities and to communities to protect nature and to promote 
respect for all the elements comprising an ecosystem. 
42  Gongqose para 4. 
43  Gongqose para 5. 
44  Gongqose para 2. 
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4.2 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 
The Constitution provides for an unqualified right to the environment and 
unequivocally makes it clear that the legislator is empowered to provide a 
regulatory framework to advance the goals of a clean environment.45 The 
legislator has endeavored to do so through the promulgation of legislation 
to this effect.  
4.3 National Environmental Management of Protected Areas Act 
The Dwesa-Cwebe Nature Reserve is affected by this Act in terms of 
Section 9(d) of the NEMPA, which incorporate nature reserves within the 
specific types of protected areas.46 Of interest to this note is section 2, which 
deals with the objectives of the Act, particularly the promotion of the 
participation of local communities in the management of protected areas. 
The Gonqose case exposes a lack of participation by local communities as 
indicated in the Act as one of its objectives.47 It highlights the efforts taken 
by the Dwesa-Cwebe communities against the enforcement of the 
prohibition of fishing in the protected areas by alluding to the 
correspondence exchanged from 2006 to 2008 between the communities 
and the Department of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and the 
numerous meetings held between the representatives of two parties 
concerning access by the communities to and the sustainable utilisation and 
                                                 
45  Section 24 of the Constitution provides that "everyone has the right (a) to an 
environment that is not harmful to their health or wellbeing; and (b) to have the 
environment protected, for the benefit of present and future generations, through 
reasonable legislative and other measures that (i) prevent pollution and ecological 
degradation; (ii) promote conservation; and (iii) secure ecologically sustainable 
development and use of natural resources while promoting justifiable economic and 
social development." 
46  "The system of protected areas in South Africa consists of the following kinds of 
protected areas: (a) special nature reserves, national parks, nature reserves and 
protected environments; (b) world heritage sites, (c) marine protected areas; (d) 
specially protected forest areas, forest nature reserves and forest wilderness areas 
and (e) mountain catchment areas." 
47  "(a) to provide, within the framework of national legislation, including the National 
Environmental Management Act, for the declaration and management of protected 
areas; (b) to provide for co-operative governance in the declaration and 
management of protected areas; (c) to effect a national system of protected areas in 
South Africa as part of a strategy to manage and conserve its biodiversity;  (d) to 
provide for a diverse and representative network of protected areas on state land, 
private land, communal land and marine waters; (e) to promote sustainable 
utilisation of protected areas for the benefit of people, in a manner that would 
preserve the ecological character of such areas; (f) to promote participation of local 
communities in the management of protected areas, where appropriate: and (g) to 
provide for the continued existence of South African National Parks." 
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benefit of marine resources in the marine protected area.48 These efforts 
were unproductive. It is our contention that the dearth of participation by 
cultural communities in the declaration and management of protected areas, 
as the provisions of this section seem to imply, flies in the face of the cultural 
rights of such communities.  
It is our further view that the NEMPA's attitude of advancing ecological 
preservation while absolutely disregarding the rituals and customs of the 
communities affected invites consequences akin to those alluded to by 
Himonga: "the obvious result is that state law is often ignored where it is not 
compatible with the social and cultural milieu in which it is applied."49 This 
disregard of state law where there is dissonance with customary rights and 
cultural practices is what Mr Gonqose and others were relying on in their 
continual use of the MPA contrary to the regulation as stipulated. The 
parties had been fishing there previously, and had been taught how to fish 
by their fathers, who in turn had been taught by their fathers. This is part of 
their legacy that had been passed down from generation to generation.  
The Gongqose case serves to indicate the dangers of legislating, so to 
speak, "above the heads" of customary communities and their interests in 
their customs. Preventing people directly or indirectly from practising their 
cultural beliefs and customs cannot be said to be beneficial or in any way to 
advance the notion of a diverse society. In essence, we submit that 
Gongqose is an unkind pointer to the fact of lack of an apparent willingness 
by the legislator to make informed decisions regarding the participation by 
local communities with regard to the management of protected areas as 
enjoined by the provisions of section 2 of the NEMPA. 
4.4 Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998 (MLRA) 
In its long title, the MLRA provides that it aims for the long-term sustainable 
utilisation of marine living resources and the protection of certain marine 
living resources.50 These aims coincide with what was taught to Mr Gonqose 
and company in ensuring that there would always be more fish for the 
future.51 This makes one question the necessity of promulgating "foreign" 
                                                 
48  Gongqose para 13. 
49  Himonga 2011 Acta Juridica 115. 
50  Marine Living Resources Act 18 of 1998, long title: "to provide for the conservation 
of the marine ecosystem, the long-term sustainable utilisation of marine living 
resources and the orderly access to exploitation, utilisation and protection of certain 
marine living resources; and for these purposes to provide for the exercise of control 
over marine living resources in a fair and equitable manner to the benefit of all the 
citizens of South Africa; and to provide for matters connected therewith." 
51  Gonqose para 27. 
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provisions of law to limit a customary law right. Section 2 makes provision 
for the need to conserve marine living resources for both present and future 
generations, a need which was acknowledged long before the declaration 
of protected areas.52 The Dwesa-Cwebe communities have demonstrable 
skills in and knowledge of preserving marine living resources for present 
and future generation. As indicated above, one of the methods used to 
preserve marine species is by not catching or taking away fish with eggs 
and juvenile fish when they fish.53 
5 Conclusion 
In paragraphs 50-59 in particular Gongqose provides the clarity necessary 
to infer that customary law is finally taking its place as an equal with the 
common law in our legal amalgam. Read in a proper context, and debunking 
its “otherness” in our legal milieu, section 211(3) of the Constitution is 
central to every proactive infusion of customary law post constitutionalism. 
No doubt one swallow can never make a summer, but Gongqose serves as 
a model for interpretation that promotes both customary rights and cultural 
practices. The stance taken here, we submit, calls on the courts to become 
active participants in the creation and sustaining of the constitutionally valid 
practices of customary law and custom. It is not in dispute that a safe 
environment is constitutionally guaranteed. However, nothing should ever 
                                                 
52  Section 2 states the objectives and principles of the Act, namely: "(a) the need to 
achieve optimum utilisation and ecologically sustainable development of marine 
living resources; (b) the need to conserve marine living resources for both present  
and future generations; (c) the need to apply precautionary approaches in respect 
of the management and development of marine living resources; (d) the need to 
utilise marine living resources to achieve economic growth, human resource 
development, capacity building within fisheries and marine culture branches,  
employment creation and a sound ecological balance consistent with the 
development objectives of the national government; (e) the need to protect the 
ecosystem as a whole, including species which are not targeted for exploitation; (f) 
the need to preserve marine biodiversity; (g) the need to minimise marine pollution;  
(h) the need to achieve to the extent practicable a broad and accountable 
participation in the decision-making processes provided for in this Act; (i) Any 
relevant obligation of the national government or the Republic in terms of any 
international agreement or applicable rule of international law; (j) the need to 
restructure the fishing industry to address historical imbalances and to achieve 
equity within all branches of the fishing industry; (k) the need to promote equitable 
access to and involvement in all aspects of the fishing industry and, in particular, to 
rectify past prejudice against women, the youth and persons living with disabilities; 
(l) the need to recognise approaches to fisheries management which contribute to 
food security, socio-economic development and the alleviation of poverty; and (m) 
the need to recognise that fish may be allocated through a multi-species approach. "   
53  Gonqose para 27. 
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suggest that cultural rituals and norms pose a harm to our common 
wellbeing. 
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